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Abstract—Most IoT systems are using or exchanging user
related information between system components. This means that
privacy is a key factor in these systems. Privacy, both in terms
of not allowing unauthorized access to information, but also in
terms of handling sensitive information correctly and responsibly.
As IoT systems typically are comprised of many software and
hardware distributed components, ensuring privacy is a chal-
lenging task. This paper proposes a risk rating methodology for
identifying and rating privacy risks, and demonstrates how to
apply this methodology in an IoT use case set in the context of
the EU H2020 BIG IoT project. It is also demonstrated how to
handle the results of the risk rating methodology.
Index Terms—Risk assessment; Internet of Things; IoT; secu-
rity; privacy;
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has largely ex-
panded and the number of IoT devices is evermore increasing.
Today, IoT use cases span over a wide variety of application
domains, ranging from smart homes over e-health systems to
industrial environments. Things used in such applications are
made available through IoT platforms. These platforms can be
located on the device, fog, or cloud level.
A multitude of such platforms exist today. In order to
enable cross-platform and even cross-domain application de-
velopment, different initiatives are determined to form IoT
ecosystems. An example for such an ecosystem initiative is
the European H2020 BIG IoT project1 [1].
BIG IoT has two main objectives. The first one is defining
a shared interface, i.e., the so-called BIG IoT API comprising
common functionalities such as service discovery, access, and
event handling. This API needs to be supported by all partici-
pating platforms, often in addition to their existing proprietary
interface, as illustrated in figure 1. The second objective is
establishing a centralized marketplace where platforms as
well as value-adding services can be registered, searched,
and subscribed by applications. In the BIG IoT project, these
technologies are deployed in multiple pilot scenarios and
involving various IoT platforms, services, and applications
from the Smart Cities domain.
Besides the evident benefits that can be achieved by such
IoT ecosystems, dealing with security and privacy in the IoT is
more challenging and more complex than it is in conventional
networks, mainly by 4 reasons: 1) a very dynamic set of
services and applications intensively handling data types with
also very dynamic formats; 2) a multitude of usage scenarios,
1http://big-iot.eu
Figure 1. The BIG IoT approach for building an ecosystem of IoT platforms
(source: [2]).2
stakeholder settings for data provisioning and usage; 3) the
high speed of information propagation and tool development
in an IoT ecosystem; and 4) the lack of a simple security
methodology that does not rely on long lists of factors that
are complex to apply.
The continued growth of IoT ecosystems will heavily de-
pend on properly addressing the security and privacy chal-
lenges that come from them.
Among the different security and privacy requirements
that have been identified to ignite a secure and reliable IoT
ecosystem [2], privacy by design is key. Indeed, it has been
literally requested (“Data protection by design” - DPD) in
the Article 25 of the General Data Protection Regulation [3],
which will become enforceable from May 2018.
DPD refers to building privacy features from the very
beginning of the design process instead of modifying or
adding new features at a later stage. This fact involves the
consideration of privacy in the full software development life
cycle (SDLC). Notice that introducing privacy in the SDLC
does not necessarily imply added costs. The cost of a data
breach differs for every organization. As stated in [4], on
average, all organizations in European countries such as France
2Icons by Freepik from http://www.flaticon.com
and Germany will incur the cost of at least 3 million euros
for a data breach. According to this, investing in DPD should
be understood as a factor of economical savings and not the
other way round. It can help in saving direct operational costs
due to data breaches and indirect cost due to the consequent
loss of reputation.
However, the appropriate privacy measures will strongly
depend on the identified risks. In the end, security always
comes down to making a risk assessment. Identifying the
risks is of paramount importance in order to fully understand
the security and privacy threats and to support a mitigation
strategy. A risk rating methodology (RRM) is therefore key
to establish metrics that allow to evaluate the severity of the
vulnerabilities. Therefore, every identified issue should have
a corresponding score that should allow to properly prioritize
how and when it is addressed on the SDLC. An appropriate
RRM can also be a valuable tool to achieve compliance with
the GDPR in a near future.
There are several proposals for risk analysis in specific IoT
ecosystem [5]–[7] as well as many works identifying privacy
issues, challenges and implications [8]–[10]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is not yet a clear methodology for
the analysis and integration of privacy-related risk assessment
results into the SDLC, in a sense of properly assigning a pri-
ority to development issues/actions derived from the analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we
present an adaptation of the Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) RRM, defined in [11], to the specifics of
an IoT ecosystem, in particular the BIG IoT ecosystem. The
target is to provide a simple but effective methodology that
could easily mark the identified risks and include them into the
SDLC as software issues to be addressed with an appropriate
priority. The proposed methodology is specifically tuned to
analyse online IoT platforms and services with regard to
privacy risks. Moreover, it is also shown how the results of the
risk assessment are transformed into development issues that
are addressed in the SDLC. A use case example in the BIG
IoT project is presented in section III. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in section IV.
II. FROM THE OWASP RISK RATING METHODOLOGY TO A
BIG IOT RISK RATING METHODOLOGY
Integrating security and privacy analysis into the SDLC
will lead to costs saving by early discovery and fixing of
vulnerabilities. There are many approaches to risk analysis
[12]–[14], where the OWASP-proposed methodology [12] is
considered in this work.
The OWASP RRM is a general-purpose RRM that covers
evaluation of the potential attacker, the exploit evaluation and
detection, and finally, the evaluation of the technical and
business impact in different domains. In our scenario, the
domain is limited to IoT, and specifically to exchange of data
and services related to IoT. Specific for the IoT domain is
that IoT platform collect and process big quantities of data
from myriads of sensor units. The collected data is then used
by services and applications to provide services to users,
sometimes also based on input from users.
A. Risk evaluation
We focus on the risk analysis of privacy and data breaches
and their consequences in the IoT scenario. With such a
purpose, we consider as baseline the risk factors of the
OWASP RRM. Then, we select and tune the factors that are
relevant for our scenario and we also propose new key factors
that, from our point of view, are lacking in OWASP RRM.
Once we have the list of factors, as detailed below, we score
the factors from 1 to 9, where 1 is low impact or likelihood
and 9 is high. Unlike with the OWASP approach, we also
assign weights to the factors considering the idiosyncrasy of
the analysed scenario.
The overall likelihood and impact (both technical and busi-
ness) are computed as the weighted arithmetic mean of their
factors. Therefore, the overall values are calculated by taking
the sum of the scores multiplied by their weights and dividing
by the sum of the weights. Estimating the associated risk to
the business is just as important, since the resources available
to fix the vulnerabilities will often depend on it.
The results are then classified into 3 levels; 0 to 3, 3 to 6,
and 6 to 9, which are denoted as low, medium and high
respectively. Finally, the risks are evaluated by combining
impact and likelihood by using table I. Additionally, we have
two interesting edge cases which will have particular names:
• critical: these are risks with high probability and
high impact attacks. These risks are the ones that should
be addressed by the company in first place.
• negligible: these are risks with low probability and
low impact attacks. A company may not address them or
just ignore them depending on the available resources.
Table I
OVERALL RISK SEVERITY INDICATION BASED ON THE DETECTED IMPACT
AND LIKELIHOOD
Likelihood
Impact low medium high
high medium high critical
medium low medium high
low negligible low medium
Following, we show the selected factors for the risk analysis
and their weights.
B. Weighting of factors
In the following, we explain the factors, we estimate how
they should be computed, and how they are weighted. The
weights depend on how relevant the various factors are in
the IoT scenario, and which factors are more important than
others. As a starting point all factors are assigned the weight
of 1 and then reduced according to importance and relevance,
and factors with 0 weight are dropped.
1) Threat agent factors:
a) Skill level: Weight: 1. This factor describes the re-
quired skill level of the attacker to perform the attack, which
is relevant in determining how realistic the exploit is. Note the
description is changed from the OWASP description. Security
penetration skills (1); advanced computer user (5); no technical
skills (9).
b) Motive: Weight: 0.5. This factor describes how mo-
tivated the attacker is to perform the exploit. The importance
of this factor in BIG IoT is currently reduced, since the focus
of the risk analysis is to evaluate the severity of data breach,
and to a lesser extent the payoff of the attacker. Low or no
reward (1); possible reward (5); high reward (9).
c) Opportunity: Weight: 1. This factor describes the
opportunity or resources needed to perform the exploit. Much
like the skill level, this factor also helps in determining how
realistic the exploit is. Full access or expensive resources
required (1); Special access or resources required (5); Can
be done by readily available off-the-shelf equipment, without
any constraints on physical presence or special software (9).
d) Size: Weight: 1. This factor describes the scope of
the attack, i.e. in terms of how large the group of potential
victims is. Note the description is changed from the OWASP
description. Just one (1); tens of individuals (5); thousands (9).
2) Vulnerability factors:
a) Ease of discovery: Weight: 0.25. This factor describes
how easy it is for attackers to discover the exploit. Due to the
speed at which knowledge of exploits spread on the Internet,
the importance of this factor is reduced, as it is less important
if it is easier or harder to discover. Practically impossible (1);
difficult but possible (5); automated tools available (9).
b) Ease of exploit: Weight: 0.25. This factor describes
how easy it is to perform the exploit and to obtain access to
functionalities or data, but also in terms of how much effort
must be spent to be able to take advantage of the functionalities
or data. The importance of this factor is reduced because it
should be assumed that if an exploit exists, then automated
solutions will appear over time for exploiting it. For this reason
the factor has less impact. Theoretical (1); difficult but possible
(5); automated tools available (9).
c) Awareness: Weight: 0.25. This factor describes how
aware potential attackers are of this exploit. Its importance
is reduced due to the speed with which exploits and tools
utilizing them are propagated. This means that if only a few
attackers are aware of the exploit today, this will change
rapidly. Unknown (1); hidden (5); public knowledge (9).
d) Intrusion detection: Weight: 1. This factor describes
the capability of detecting if the exploit is utilized, i.e. in terms
of logging access. Active detection in application (1); logged
and reviewed (5); not logged (9).
3) Technical impact factors:
a) Loss of privacy: Weight: 1. This factor describes how
accurately the functionalities or data exposed via the exploit
allow an attacker to track users or their actions. Note this
is a new factor not defined in OWASP. Minimal non-sensitive
data disclosed (1); Minimal critical data disclosed to extensive
non-sensitive data disclosed (5); Personal information that is
directly linked to an individual (9).
b) Loss of accountability: Weight: 0.5. This factor de-
scribes to what extent the actions of an attacker are traceable.
Its importance is reduced because it is of less importance to
be able to identify the individual attacker. Fully traceable (1);
possibly traceable (5); completely anonymous (9).
4) Business impact factors:
a) Financial damage: Weight: 0.5. This factor describes
the financial impact of the exploit, i.e. in terms of how much
the business or business model is financially affected. The
importance of this factor is reduced because the financial
impact will vary for different cases, and for this reason should
not be a determining factor of the risk evaluation. Furthermore,
this methodology focuses on a general IoT ecosystem. Less
than the cost to fix the vulnerability (1); some effect on annual
profit (5); bankruptcy (9).
b) Reputation damage: Weight: 0.5. This factor de-
scribes the damage to the reputation of the business based on
the exploit. The importance of this factor is reduced because
influence on reputation will have different impact on different
businesses, and again this methodology focuses on a general
IoT ecosystem. For this reason this factor should not be a
determining factor of the risk evaluation. Minimal damage (1);
loss of goodwill (5); brand damage (9).
c) Privacy violation scale: Weight: 1. This factor de-
scribes the scale of devices and/or users affected in an exploit,
i.e. how many entities are affected by the risk. Minimal scale
(1); few hundreds (5); millions (9).
C. Integration with the SDLC
The last step in the risk evaluation process is to feed the
results to the development cycle, so that risks can be mitigated
during the next development iteration.
In figure 2 the steps of the SDLC and their ordering are
illustrated next to the Risk Rating cycle. The risk rating will
be done as a parallel process and the results will be fed to the
SDLC as part of the Requirement Analysis step. In this way
the design can be modified to handle the identified risks.
The risks with the highest severity level, i.e. critical and
high, should be the first to be included in the development
cycle, followed by the medium and low, and finally negligible.
However, due to limited duration of development cycles,
there might only be resources to mitigate the risks with the
highest severity. Then another iteration of the risk analysis
should be done, also focusing on new functionalities of the
system, before feeding the risks to the development process
as requirements.
III. USE CASE EXAMPLE: ENVIRONMENT MONITORING
SERVICE
We present in the following a short, simple but represen-
tative example of how the BIG IoT RRM in section II has
Figure 2. Illustration of how the Risk Rating works parallel to SDLC, feeding development issues into SDLC.
been applied to a BIG IoT service. The chosen BIG IoT
service is the Environment Monitoring Service (EMS), which
provides in a centralized manner data gathered from different
environment-related offerings3. Currently two types of data
sources are being used: pollution sensors in selected private
cars and noise metering stations at different city spots.
Selected private cars. BOSCH’s members in BIG IoT have
installed Bezirk4 devices in several cars provided by
SEAT to the project. Installed devices can query the
internal pollution sensors and offer the readings as well
as the current position of the car.
Noise metering stations. Cities commonly have a deploy-
ment of noise stations that report current level of noise
in specific spots. Noise data is used in the BIG IoT to
compute green routes and drive vehicles through the less-
noisy paths, allowing to distribute the noise and keep it
under a certain threshold all over the city.
The BIG IoT security team carried out an analysis of the
potential risks associated to the EMS use case. The result of
the analysis identified three risks:
Vehicle/people tracking. For cars are sharing their position,
an attacker could track vehicles if the shared data is not
properly anonymised. Even with no identifiers, an at-
tacker could track a vehicle computing viable trajectories
based on the pairs position-time. Moreover, if a vehicle
is linked to a person (e.g. by visual contact), people can
be actually tracked.
Accessing/Hacking the in-vehicle internal bus. Since the
Bezirk “thing” is connected to the in-vehicle information
bus, if an attacker gains access to the Bezirk device, it
could also try to hack the internal bus and thus eavesdrop
internal/not public vehicle data and even disrupt the
vehicle operation by mangling those data.
Noise level disruption. If the attacker can tamper noise data,
he can influence route recommendations since the noise
is a factor in these recommendations. For example, the
3In BIG IoT a “offering” is a description of what a service is providing,
how to access it and under what conditions
4Bezirk is s Startup from Bosch that was established to cater to agility in
a highly dynamic environment.
attacker can report that an area has no noise at all. Then,
many vehicles would be routed through this area (and
effectively, the attacker is creating a noisy area). On the
other hand, if the attacker is able to report a high level of
noise, certain areas would be less considered as a routing
options in route recommendations.
To keep the overall paper length short, in the following we
present the application of the BIG IoT RRM for just the first
risk; although, the application it is very similar for the other
two ones. First, we score every factor based on the description
provided in section II. Then, we derive some actions that can
avoid or mitigate the identified risk. The score for the risk will
be used to prioritize actions derived. Finally, we comment how
the actions become issues for the SDLC and, if applied, how
the risk assessment is updated.
A. Vehicle/people tracking: Scoring
OVERALL LIKELIHOOD: 7.95 (HIGH)
• Skill level. With some technical skills, an attacker should
be able to track vehicles based on the identifiers provided
by the EMS.
Weight: 1 Score: 7
• Motive. Tracking could allow spying on specific people.
Depending on the target, the motivation could be high
(potential reward).
Weight: .5 Score: 5
• Opportunity. The attack could be operated from any
standard computer connected to the EMS.
Weight: 1 Score: 9
• Size. The attack could affect thousands to millions of
people.
Weight: 1 Score: 9
• Ease of discovery. It should be easy to detect by basic
input/output verification that the EMS is also providing
identifiers or pseudo-identifiers along with the pollution
and position data.
Weight: 0.25 Score: 7
• Ease of exploit. Once the attacker has an array of
positions and dates it is a matter of simple data processing
to get the path of the victim.
Weight: 0.25 Score: 8
• Awareness. Since the format of data provided by the
service is published on the BIG IoT marketplace as an
offering description, it is obvious to be aware of the
presence of identifiers or pseudo-identifiers.
Weight: 0.25 Score: 6
• Intrusion detection. The attack will not be logged since
the attacker just consumes the same data as any other
standard consumer.
Weight: 1 Score: 9
TECHNICAL IMPACT: 6.33 (HIGH)
• Loss of privacy. An attacker can potentially track a per-
son if it could be linked to a vehicle by another external
source (e.g. by direct visual observation or by publicly
accessible street cameras). Therefore, the attacker would
be able to infer about the behavior about a person or a
group of people.
Weight: 1 Score: 7
• Loss of accountability. Since the EMS is an authenti-
cated service, based on the attacker queries, the attack
could be traceable.
Weight: 0.5 Score: 5
BUSINESS IMPACT: 5.50 (MEDIUM)
• Financial damage. The knowledge of the vulnerability
would probably encourage people to leave the service or
to explicitly demand to not be accounted. Therefore, a
strong effect on annual profit should be expected.
Weight: 0.5 Score: 7
• Reputation damage. A loss of goodwill is expected in
the short term regarding to this service. A full brand dam-
age is not expected since most of the affected individuals
won’t see affected their privacy.
Weight: 0.5 Score: 5
• Privacy violation scale. While thousands to millions
tracking data of vehicles will be disclosed. Linking a
vehicle identifier with a person requires very specific
external information (e.g. visual contact). Therefore, the
breach would likely affect no more than hundreds of
people.
Weight: 1 Score: 5
Based on the assigned scores and the data in Table I, the
result of the application of the BIG IoT RRM to the EMS is
depicted in Table II.
Table II
APPLICATION OF THE BIG IOT RRM TO THE EMS
Overall likelihood high (7.95)
Technical impact high (6.33)
Business impact medium (5.50)
Technical risk severity critical
Business risk severity high
Based on the results of the analysis, priority actions should
be carried out in order to avoid or at least mitigate this risk.
Those actions are explained in the following subsection.
B. Vehicle/people tracking: Actions
To avoid potential tracking, data provided by the cars should
be anonymised. Therefore, the use of identifiers or pseudo-
identifiers is discouraged and, in any case, they shouldn’t be
stored by the service. In order to mitigate these risks the
following actions should be carried out:
1) Instead of providing a measure at a given position (with
GPS accuracy), provide pollution at a given area or street
segment. In many cases, this fact will disable to track
vehicles based on the pairs position-time. This action
should be preferably implemented at device level; that
is to say, in the devices already installed in the cars.
2) If possible, revisit device and service code to avoid
sending potential identifiers or pseudo identifiers from
the cars to the EMS.
3) Revisit service code to ensure that no potential identifiers
or pseudo-identifiers are stored and/or provided by the
EMS.
4) Check data already stored by the EMS (before imple-
menting action 3) to filter out identifiers or pseudo-
identifiers.
The four actions became issues that got into the SDLC
of the EMS with priority critical, since in BIG IoT we
have agreed to use the worst-case scenario (either technical
or business risk). Therefore, they were fixed in a short term.
In fact the EMS developing team already implemented the
required actions in less than a working day.
The EMS is neither storing nor providing any identifiers.
Moreover, position data has been generalized to street seg-
ments. Now, while still being useful for the purpose of green
routing advice, the likelihood of linking vehicles to viable
trajectories, and therefore the likelihood of tracking, has been
minimized.
Thanks to the applied RRM, the EMS is now more privacy-
friendly to its users.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Nowadays, a plethora of IoT platforms and solutions exist,
but yet no large-scale and cross-platform IoT ecosystems have
been developed. This is mainly due to the fragmentation
of IoT platforms and interfaces, as this variety results in
high market entry barriers. The BIG IoT project aims at
establishing interoperability across platforms in order to ignite
an IoT ecosystem. Core technological pillars of BIG IoT are
a common API as well as a marketplace for all participants of
the IoT ecosystem, including devices, end-users, and service
providers. Key to its success is to define appropriate levels of
security and privacy.
This work proposes an approach for identifying and rating
privacy risks in the IoT domain. The approach is based on
the OWASP risk rating methodology but adapted to the IoT
domain. This is done by only selecting the most relevant
factors and also applying weights to the factors to further
adjust them for the domain. The approach is exemplified
by applying it to a typical IoT use case namely the En-
vironment monitoring service. By applying the privacy risk
rating methodology the various factors are evaluated for an
identified risk. The overall risk severity is obtained based on
the factor scores, which forms the basis for recommending
remediation of the risk. The remediation consists of a number
of recommendations for aggregating location data to areas
and removing identifiers from the data. Furthermore, it is also
illustrated how to integrate the risk rating methodology with
the SDLC.
With IoT becoming more widespread and integrated as parts
of big complex systems, the aspect of maintaining the privacy
of data is more relevant than ever. In doing this, it is important
to be able to identify and evaluate risks to privacy of data,
which can be done using the proposed RRM. In the presented
example it is shown that the approach can cover complex
system setups, such as a use case in the BIG IoT ecosystem.
Future work includes applying the proposed RRM in more
use cases, evaluating its applicability. While doing this it
should be formalized how the remediation actions, which
are the outcome of the RRM, should be included in the
SDLC. Moreover, future integration with threat/vulnerability
databases for the automated identification of IoT-related vul-
nerabilities should also be considered.
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